New Problems of Philosophy: Cognitive Phenomenology by Elijah Chudnoff read TXT, DJV
9780415660242 0415660246 Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person 'feel' to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought and cognition. Does cognition have its own phenomenal character? Can introspection tell us either way? If consciousness flows in an unbroken 'stream' as William James argued, how might a punctuated sequence of thoughts fit into it? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a clarification of the nature of the debate about cognitive phenomenology and the network of concepts and theses that are involved in it. He then examines the following topics: introspection and knowledge of our own thoughts phenomenal contrast arguments the value of consciousness the temporal structure of experience the holistic character of experience and the interdependence of sensory and cognitive states the relationship between phenomenal character and mental representation Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology., Phenomenology is the study of the raw, non-cognitive, subjective aspects of the mind, such as vision and touch, and those conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person or phenomenological 'feel' to them. They are often taken to be radically different to or in some sense prior to thought itself. This is the first book to fully the question of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought itself. Can phenomenology have a cognitive or conceptual character? Is introspection an argument for cognitive phenomenology, or against it? If consciousness is an unbroken 'stream as William James argued, how can it be cognitive? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a brief historical overview of the origins of cognitive phenomenology in the work of phenomenologists such as Brentano and Husserl and later philosophers such as Ryle, Shoemaker and Smart. He then examines the following topics: phenomenal contrast arguments introspective awareness cognitive phenomenology and temporality, including the stream of consciousness cognitive phenomenology and intrinsic value: do some cognitive experiences possess intrinsic value because of their distinctive phenomenology? intentionality the relation between cognitive phenomenology and reasoning. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology. "
9780415660242 0415660246 Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person 'feel' to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought and cognition. Does cognition have its own phenomenal character? Can introspection tell us either way? If consciousness flows in an unbroken 'stream' as William James argued, how might a punctuated sequence of thoughts fit into it? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a clarification of the nature of the debate about cognitive phenomenology and the network of concepts and theses that are involved in it. He then examines the following topics: introspection and knowledge of our own thoughts phenomenal contrast arguments the value of consciousness the temporal structure of experience the holistic character of experience and the interdependence of sensory and cognitive states the relationship between phenomenal character and mental representation Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology., Phenomenology is the study of the raw, non-cognitive, subjective aspects of the mind, such as vision and touch, and those conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person or phenomenological 'feel' to them. They are often taken to be radically different to or in some sense prior to thought itself. This is the first book to fully the question of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought itself. Can phenomenology have a cognitive or conceptual character? Is introspection an argument for cognitive phenomenology, or against it? If consciousness is an unbroken 'stream as William James argued, how can it be cognitive? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a brief historical overview of the origins of cognitive phenomenology in the work of phenomenologists such as Brentano and Husserl and later philosophers such as Ryle, Shoemaker and Smart. He then examines the following topics: phenomenal contrast arguments introspective awareness cognitive phenomenology and temporality, including the stream of consciousness cognitive phenomenology and intrinsic value: do some cognitive experiences possess intrinsic value because of their distinctive phenomenology? intentionality the relation between cognitive phenomenology and reasoning. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology. "